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Americans have always mistrusted executive power, but only re-
cently has “the unitary executive” emerged as the bogeyman of Amer-
ican politics.  According to popular accounts, the idea of the unitary 
executive is one of “presidential dictatorship”1 that promises not only 
“a dramatic expansion of the chief executive’s powers”2 but also “a 
minimum of legislative or judicial oversight”3 for an American Presi-
dent to exercise “essentially limitless power”4 and thereby to “destroy 
the balance of power shared by our three co-equal branches of gov-
ernment.”5  Readers of the daily press are led to conclude the very 
notion of a unitary executive is a demonic modern invention of po-
litical conservatives,6 “a marginal constitutional theory” invented by 
Professor John Yoo at UC Berkeley,7 or a bald-faced power grab con-
jured up by the administration of George W. Bush,8 including, most 
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 1 John E. Finn, Opinion, Enumerating Absolute Power?  Who Needs the Rest of the Constitution?, 
HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 6, 2008, at C1. 
 2 Tim Rutten, Book Review, Lincoln, As Defined by War, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at E1. 
 3 Editorial, Executive Excess, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Nov. 12, 2008, at A22. 
 4 Robyn Blumner, Once Again We’ll Be a Nation of Laws, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 11, 
2009, at 5P. 
 5 Stephen L. Goldstein, Opinion, McCain’s an Injustice, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 29, 
2008, at 23A. 
 6 Dana D. Nelson, Opinion, How Powerful a President?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at A19. 
 7 Tim Rutten, Opinion, Bush’s Executive Tyranny, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2009, at A29. 
 8 See, e.g., John C. Binkley, Book Review, PARAMETERS 123, 125 (2009) (reviewing TIMOTHY 
J. LYNCH & ROBERT S. SINGH, AFTER BUSH:  THE CASE FOR CONTINUITY IN AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY (2008)) (discussing “the Bush Administration’s ideal of the unitary ex-
ecutive with its potential for unlimited inherent executive power”); Editorial, Senators 
Should Grill Court Pick, SACRAMENTO BEE, May 28, 2009, at A20 (“The reality is that in re-
cent years the president and the Supreme Court have aggressively claimed powers at the 
expense of Congress.  President George W. Bush, for example, claimed ‘unitary execu-
tive’ powers, going around laws passed by Congress.”); Michael Tomasky, Obama Triumph:  
The Transition:  Expect the Man With the Ball to Play It His Way, GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2008, at 
H3 (denouncing “the Bush-Cheney theory of the ‘unitary executive’”). 
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ominously, Vice President Cheney.9  It is no surprise that the New York 
Times agreed with then-candidate Joe Biden’s assessment that “Mr. 
Cheney’s theory of the ‘unitary executive’” made him “the most dan-
gerous vice president we’ve had in American history.”10 
In fact, the theory of a unitary executive has nothing to do with 
the extent of presidential power but only with who is to exercise those 
powers, however broad, allocated to the executive.  Its proponents 
seek not to evade the limitations of separated powers, but rather in-
sist—especially when dealing with the other branches—that the Pres-
ident alone is responsible for the actions of the executive branch.  
The idea seems ominous today because so many functions have been 
allocated to the now-fragmented executive branch that reuniting it 
under presidential leadership seems to the present generation both 
to enhance presidential authority unimaginably and to create an un-
manageable administrative structure. 
We suggest the “unitary executive” has fallen into ill repute and 
apparent obsolescence not because of an executive bent upon autoc-
racy but because of a legislature freed from the constraints of the 
separation of powers.  In Part I we introduce the nondelegation doc-
trine as a necessary corollary of the unitary executive and examine 
the failure of the Supreme Court to enforce that doctrine.  In Part II 
we examine the similar failure of the President to resist encroach-
ments by the Congress.  In Part III we explore the implications of 
these failures. 
I. 
No reader of this Journal will be surprised to hear that Dick Che-
ney did not originate the idea that the executive power should be 
united under presidential control.  That was part of the original con-
 
 9 See, e.g., Peter Baker, When 535 Take on Number 1, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at WK1 (“A 
young Dick Cheney, chief of staff for the weak, unelected president who followed Nixon, 
Gerald R. Ford, resolved when he returned to the White House a quarter-century later to 
do all he could to restore that lost power.  The ‘unitary executive’ theory he embraced 
held that because the Constitution provides for only one executive branch, Congress 
cannot intrude upon the president’s duties to manage the government. . . . With the ac-
quiescence of a Republican Congress and a public eager to fight terrorism, Mr. Bush and 
Mr. Cheney advanced their cause for years—the secret deliberations of an energy task 
force; the Patriot Act; ‘signing statements’ that express reservations about enforcing a bill; 
warrantless surveillance; unrestricted detention of terrorism suspects; the reinterpretation 
of the Geneva Conventions.”); Jonathan Raban, The Golden Trumpet, GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 
2009, at R2 (condemning “the spectre of a dictatorial administration, emboldened by 
Dick Cheney’s theory of the ‘unitary executive’”). 
 10 Editorial, Dick Cheney, Role Model, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A18. 
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stitutional design.  In fact, the provision of a unitary executive was a 
response to the fear, seldom heard today, that the Congress would 
become tyrannical.  Indeed, for all the contemporary hysteria over 
the unitary executive, few seemed to recognize, until Professors Cala-
bresi and Yoo began to publish their research on the subject,11 how 
important the idea has been in American history.  Contentious de-
bate over the separation of powers and over the unitary executive in 
particular has been a perennial feature of American politics, about 
which the Founders left warnings worth revisiting today. 
In The Federalist No. 51, Madison wrote, “[i]n republican govern-
ment, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”12  His rem-
edy for this tendency toward domination was to divide the legislature 
into different chambers, while the executive was to remain unitary so 
it would not be overmatched in its battles with the legislature.  “As the 
weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be thus di-
vided,” explained Madison, “the weakness of the executive may re-
quire, on the other hand, that it should be fortified.”13 
Today, Madison’s warning seems quaint.  Having seen the socially 
transformative power of the courts,14 many scoff at Hamilton’s charac-
terization of the judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch.15  Editorial-
ists, as we have seen, conclude the executive is the most powerful 
branch and the legislature weak by comparison.16  Against this newly 
received wisdom, we argue that Madison was right, and his modern 
inversion mistaken. 
We start with the simple reminder that the Framers of our Consti-
tution did not establish a parliamentary system with a prime minister 
dependent upon the national legislature.  The President is not se-
lected by the Congress; his salary is protected against any congres-
sional diminution; and his term in office is fixed.  Thus did our 
Founders seek to establish a President who was more than an agent of 
the legislature, as was the prime minister under the British constitu-
tion.  To quote Madison again: 
 
 11 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
 12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 13 Id. at 319–20. 
 14 For contrasting views of the Supreme Court’s influence upon American society, compare 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
(1990) with MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 
(1998). 
 15 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 464. 
 16 See, e.g., Senators Should Grill Court Pick, supra note 8. 
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In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of 
the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted 
on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that 
each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should 
be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as 
possible in the appointment of the members of the others.17 
The theory of the unitary executive focuses upon the extent to which 
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution—“The executive 
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of Amer-
ica”—protects the President’s authority to appoint, direct, and re-
move officers within the executive branch.18  Complementing this 
positive grant of authority to the President is the understanding that 
the other branches would be confined to their own respective 
spheres.  A necessary corollary of the theory of the unitary executive, 
then, finds expression in the nondelegation doctrine—the idea that 
the Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking powers to the executive 
or the judiciary.  It is the demise of that doctrine that has allowed the 
Congress both to augment and to fragment the executive branch by 
establishing federal agencies within the executive tasked with making 
policy pursuant to broad mandates from the Congress, agencies that 
effectively exercise legislative power through rulemaking. 
The nondelegation doctrine was once recognized as a founda-
tional principle of the separation of powers.19  Its roots go back to 
John Locke, who put it this way: 
[T]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other 
hands; for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have 
it cannot pass it over to others. . . . The power of the legislative, being de-
rived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can 
be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to 
make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power 
to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.20 
Locke developed the nondelegation doctrine out of an elementary 
maxim of the law of agency, delegata potestas non potest delegari—
delegated powers cannot be further delegated.21  Once the people 
 
 17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 318. 
 18  U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. 
 19 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate legislative 
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”). 
 20 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141, at 81 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1952) (1690). 
 21 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 13 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
1839); see also Shankland v. Mayor of Washington, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 390, 395 (1831) 
(“[T]he general rule of law is, that a delegated authority cannot be delegated.”).  But cf. 
Patrick W. Duff & Horace E. Whiteside, Delegata Potestas Non Potest Delegari:  A Maxim of 
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had delegated the lawmaking power to the legislature, it could pass 
no further lest it elude the people’s oversight. 
Chief Justice Taft recognized the nondelegation doctrine as a fix-
ture of American constitutional law.  In J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. 
United States,22 the Court considered whether the Congress may dele-
gate to the President the authority to raise or lower duties imposed by 
the Tariff Act of 1922 in order to equalize differences between for-
eign and domestic costs of production.  The Act specified the criteria 
the President was to consider and required a prior investigation by 
the Tariff Commission to inform the President’s decision.  American 
courts, especially state courts, had been grappling with the reach of 
the nondelegation doctrine since the beginning of the Republic.  
Chief Justice Taft drew upon their work in crafting his opinion, and 
the cases he cited demonstrate how the importance of the nondele-
gation doctrine to the American constitutional system was well under-
stood at the time. 
In an 1852 case, the Supreme Court of Ohio had considered 
whether the general assembly could require county commissioners, 
upon a referendum of the public, to subscribe to the capital stock of 
a private company established to build a new railroad and to issue 
bonds in payment.  The court started from first principles: 
That the general assembly can not surrender any portion of the legisla-
tive authority with which it is invested, or authorize its exercise by any 
other person or body, is a proposition too clear for argument, and is de-
nied by no one.  This inability arises no less from the general principle 
applicable to every delegated power requiring knowledge, discretion, and 
rectitude, in its exercise, than from the positive provisions of the consti-
tution itself. . . . [W]hile it continues in force, every citizen has a right to 
demand that his civil conduct shall only be regulated by the associated 
wisdom, intelligence, and integrity of the whole representation of the 
state.23 
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1888 had considered 
whether the state legislature could delegate to a commission the au-
thority to set rates for common carriers that are “equal and reason-
able.”24  The court first stated the common understanding of the 
time: 
 
American Constitutional Law, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 168 (1929) (questioning the historical pe-
digree of the nondelegation maxim). 
 22 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
 23 Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 
77, 87 (1852). 
 24 State of Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 
Co., 38 Minn. 281, 282 (1888). 
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It is, of course, one of the settled maxims in constitutional law, that the 
power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated 
by that department to any other body.  Where the sovereign power of the 
state [referring here to the people] has located the authority it must re-
main.  The department to whose judgment and wisdom this high pre-
rogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the responsibility by 
choosing other agencies, and substituting their judgment and wisdom for 
its own.25 
Despite its paean to the nondelegation principle in American law, 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, like the Supreme Court of Ohio, up-
held the challenged delegation of authority.  In J.W. Hampton the Su-
preme Court followed suit, first extolling the nondelegation doctrine 
but then upholding the challenged delegation.26  “The true distinc-
tion,” explained Chief Justice Taft, quoting the Ohio Supreme Court, 
“is, between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessar-
ily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an au-
thority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in 
pursuance of the law.”27  To operationalize that distinction, Taft de-
clared the Congress may authorize executive agents to carry out its 
legislation as long as it “lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to 
conform.”28 
Despite the careful line-drawing of the Chief Justice, the Supreme 
Court has invoked this principle to strike down an act of Congress 
exactly two times, both in the same year and with respect to the same 
act.  Section 9(c) of Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 (NIRA)29 authorized the President to prohibit the transporta-
tion in interstate commerce of petroleum products produced in ex-
cess of the amount permitted by state authority, but it did not define 
the circumstances or conditions under which the transportation was 
to be allowed or prohibited.  Instead, the President was left to adopt 
by executive order his own “Code of Fair Competition for the Petro-
leum Industry” to guide his decisions.  In Panama Refining Co. v. 
 
 25 Id. at 299. 
 26 276 U.S. at 405–06 (“The well-known maxim ‘Delegata potestas non potest delegari’ . . . has 
had wider application in the construction of our Federal and State Constitutions than it 
has in private law. . . . [I]t is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives 
up its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch . . . .”). 
 27 Id. at 407 (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co., 1 Ohio St. at 88).  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court quoted the same passage.  R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n, 38 Minn. 
at 300. 
 28 J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409. 
 29 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). 
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Ryan,30 the Court adjudged section 9(c) an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power.  “As to the transportation of oil production 
in excess of state permission, the Congress has declared no policy, 
has established no standard, has laid down no rule.  There is no re-
quirement, no definition of circumstances and conditions in which 
the transportation is to be allowed or prohibited,” explained the 
Court.31  “So far as this section is concerned, it gives to the President 
an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the 
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit.”32 
That same year, the Court also considered the “Code of Fair 
Competition for the Live Poultry Industry of the Metropolitan Area 
in and about the City of New York,” which, again pursuant to the 
NIRA, had been proposed by the industry and adopted by the Presi-
dent in an executive order.  In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States,33 the Court concluded, “[s]uch a delegation of legislative power 
is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitu-
tional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”34  Justice Cardozo, who 
had dissented in Panama Refining, now declared, “[t]his is delegation 
running riot.  No such plenitude of power is susceptible of transfer.”35 
These decisions had momentous political consequences.  The Na-
tional Recovery Administration halted operations; the Congress tem-
porarily stopped work on New Deal legislation and looked to the 
White House for a response to the Court.36  President Roosevelt did 
respond, with a lengthy press conference, angrily denouncing the 
Court for crippling the federal government and imperiling the na-
tion.  “We have got to decide one way or the other,” he said, “whether 
in some way we are going to . . . restore to the Federal Government 
the powers which exist in the national Governments of every other 
 
 30 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 31 Id. at 430. 
 32 Id. at 415. 
 33 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 34 Id. at 537. 
 35 Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
 36 See Arthur Krock, Court is Unanimous:  President Cannot Have ‘Roving Commission’ to Make 
Laws by Code, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 1 (“At NRA headquarters officials and employ-
ees sat in gloom, wondering what is to become of them . . . .”); Richberg Issues Plea:  He 
Calls on Employers to Maintain Labor, Fair Practice Standards, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 1 
(noting the demoralized atmosphere and the nervousness that abounded after the 
Court’s decision in Schechter Poultry Corp.); Roosevelt Maps Moves:  Congress at Standstill Wait-
ing for Word on White House Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1935, at 1 (stating that the Congress 
would engage in little if any business of note until the President addresses the nation). 
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Nation in the world.”37  The President accused the Court of wanting 
to revert to “the horse-and-buggy age.”38  Organized labor was out-
raged,39 but general public opinion divided because much of the 
NIRA had been unpopular.40  A debate emerged in the public press 
about judicial review and the role of the Court,41 and academics de-
liberated over whether “the ‘rule against delegation,’ as applied by 
the Supreme Court, threaten[ed] to defeat the efforts of our political 
democracy to use government as an instrumentality for the effective 
control of our national economy.”42 
Ongoing confrontation with the political branches appeared too 
perilous a course for the Court and, though it has never overruled 
Schechter Poultry or expressly repudiated the “intelligible principle” 
standard of J.W. Hampton, its standards for intelligibility have become 
so flaccid that the Congress may now delegate authority to regulate 
the private sector in “the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity’”43 
and to be “generally fair and equitable.”44 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit played a modest 
role in the last gasps of the nondelegation doctrine.  In American 
 
 37 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966 
SUP. CT. REV. 347, 357 (quoting WASH. POST, June 1, 1935). 
 38 Otto Friedrich et al., The New Deal:  FDR’s Disputed Legacy, TIME, Feb. 1, 1982, at 35. 
 39 See Louis Stark, Labor Leaders Much Disturbed, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1935, at 17 (“Organized 
labor was dazed by the Schechter case decision today . . . .”). 
 40 Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four:  Law’s Politics, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 971, 990–91 (2000). 
 41 See id. at 992–93 (“These 1935 decisions triggered a vigorous debate about the practice of 
judicial review.  There was, however, no clear opinion as to the appropriate outcome of 
the struggle.  At the end of that year, newspaper editors voted the debate about judicial 
review and the Court’s encounter with the New Deal the year’s ‘biggest’ news story.”). 
 42 James Hart, Limits of Legislative Delegation, 221 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 87 
(1942) (suggesting reinterpretation where “constitutional law that has been built upon 
precedents which antedate the American industrial revolution is not well adapted to 
modern circumstances and needs”). 
 43 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) (“The criterion governing the 
exercise of the Commission’s licensing power is the ‘public interest, convenience, or ne-
cessity.’”); see also United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939) (up-
holding the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to fix prices for agricultural com-
modities at a level that will reflect economic conditions, “provide adequate quantities of 
wholesome milk and be in the public interest”). 
 44 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (“[T]he Administrator is author-
ized . . . to promulgate regulations fixing prices of commodities which ‘in his judgment 
will be generally fair and equitable . . . .’”); see also 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.01 (1958) (“Much of the judicial talk about require-
ment of standards is contrary to the action the Supreme Court takes when delegations are 
made without standards.  The vaguest of standards are held adequate, and various delega-
tions without standards have been upheld.”). 
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Trucking Associations v. EPA,45 the D.C. Circuit considered the provi-
sion of the Clean Air Act that requires the EPA to set national ambi-
ent air quality standards for pollutants at a level “requisite to protect 
the public health” with an “adequate margin of safety.”46  Because 
ozone and particulate matter are nonthreshold pollutants,47 the EPA 
lacked a determinate criterion for setting any particular limit.  The 
EPA’s construction of the Clean Air Act left it free to set air quality 
standards at any point between zero and a concentration that would 
yield a “killer fog.”48  The court held there was no intelligible princi-
ple in the Act to govern the decision of the EPA and remanded the 
matter to the agency so that it might, if possible, construe the Act to 
provide an intelligible principle by which to govern its decisions.  On 
further review, however, the Supreme Court concluded no such con-
struction was necessary.  In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations,49 
the Court held the phrase “requisite to protect the public health” was 
determinate enough to stand alongside its precedents upholding 
statutes authorizing, for example, regulation “in the public interest.”50  
As the Court explained, “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to sec-
ond-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judg-
ment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’”51 
True, but why?  If nondelegation was so fundamental a principle 
to our constitutional order—with roots in Lockean political philoso-
phy and the very notion of popular sovereignty—why did it have so 
little a constraining effect?  Why are there no more than those two 
cases from the first half of the twentieth century in which the Su-
preme Court found an unconstitutional delegation of legislative pow-
er?  It is certainly not for want of opportunities.  Rather, we submit, 
the explanation lies in Madison’s warning about the predominance 
of the legislature in republican governments or what we might today 
call “the counter-majoritarian difficulty.”52 
 
 45 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999), rev’d in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 
457 (2001). 
 46 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006). 
 47 Nonthreshold pollutants are thought to pose some possibility of adverse health effects at 
any level of exposure above zero. 
 48 Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1036 (referring to London’s “Killer Fog” of 1952). 
 49 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 50 Id. at 472–74.  But see David Schoenbrod, Politics and the Principle That Elected Legislators 
Should Make the Laws, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 272–83 (2003) (arguing the Court’s 
interpretation of the Clean Air Act confined the EPA to regulating against “medically sig-
nificant” risks in order to avoid a delegation problem). 
 51 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (citation omitted). 
 52 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
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If we look back to the nondelegation cases upon which Chief Jus-
tice Taft relied in J.W. Hampton, we see that the judges’ rhetorical en-
thusiasm for the nondelegation doctrine was overmatched by their 
reluctance to confront the legislature.  In the Cincinnati Railroad case, 
for example, before the Court reached the nondelegation issue it de-
voted one-third of its opinion to justifying its authority to review an 
act of the legislature for constitutionality—this some fifty years after 
Marbury v. Madison.53  After noting that “[t]he Legislature is, of neces-
sity, in the first instance, to be the judge of its own constitutional 
powers,” the Court explained: 
Doubt, in their case, as in that of the courts, should be conclusive against 
all affirmative action.  This being their duty, we are bound, in all cases, to 
presume they have regarded it; and that they are clearly convinced of 
their power to pass a law before they put it in the statute book.  If a court, 
in such case, were to annul the law while entertaining doubts upon the 
subject, it would present the absurdity of one department of the govern-
ment overturning in doubt what another had established in settled con-
viction, and to make the dubious constructions of the judiciary outweigh 
the fixed conclusions of the general assembly.54 
The Minnesota Supreme Court similarly understood that the leg-
islature’s role was to pass “[f]irst, on its authority to make the enact-
ment” and only second on its “expediency.”55  This view of the legisla-
ture’s role led to the conclusion that, as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court had said in 1817, “[t]he legislature is, in the first in-
stance, the judge of its own constitutional powers, and it is only when 
manifest assumption of authority, or misapprehension of it, shall ap-
pear, that the judicial power will refuse to execute” the law.56  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court therefore announced its de-
termination “never [to] declare a statute void, unless the nullity and 
invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable 
doubt.”57 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania similarly denied the power of 
the courts “to set aside a law, unless the legislature have encroached 
on ground which they are positively or by necessary implication for-
 
 53 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & STEVE SHEPPARD, AMERICAN LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT:  THE 
BASICS 133 (2005) (noting judicial review “was specifically enshrined in some state consti-
tutions, and it had been employed in both state courts’ and federal courts’ in actions 
dealing with state statutes” prior to Marbury). 
 54 Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 
77, 84 (1852). 
 55 State of Minn. ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. 
Co., 38 Minn. 281, 299 (1888) (emphasis in original). 
 56 Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 340, 345 (1817). 
 57 In re Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834). 
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bidden to enter.”58  Kentucky’s Court of Appeals agreed that “to 
merely doubt legislative power is not enough to justify judicial resis-
tance.  This Court will not decide an act of the Legislature to be un-
constitutional on a mere doubt, but they must be fully satisfied that it 
is so.”59 
The United States Supreme Court early on expressed a similar he-
sitancy about declaring an act of Congress unconstitutional.  As Jus-
tice Chase explained, “if the court have such power, I am free to de-
clare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case.”60  So, too, 
Justice Washington:  “[t]he presumption, indeed, must always be in 
favour of the validity of laws, if the contrary is not clearly demon-
strated.”61  And Justice Paterson:  “to authorise this Court to pro-
nounce any law void, it must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the 
constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.”62 
Finally, in 1810 Chief Justice Marshall wrote,  
[I]t is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature 
is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts to be 
considered as void.  The opposition between the constitution and the law 
should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their 
incompatibility with each other.”63 
Indeed, it was none other than John Marshall—the author of Marbury 
and the godfather of judicial review—who canonized this judicial de-
ference to the legislature’s determinations of its own powers.  “Let 
the end be legitimate,” he wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland, “and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
 
 58 Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville R.R. Co., 1 Ohio St. at 85 (construing Commonwealth 
v. M’Williams, 11 Pa. 61, 70 (1849)). 
 59 City of Louisville v. Hyatt, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 177, 178 (1841) (“[W]e should be justly 
chargeable with wandering from the appropriate sphere of the judiciary department, were 
we, by a subtle elaboration of abstract principles and metaphysical doubts and difficulties, 
to endeavor to show that such a power may be questionable, and on such unstable and 
unjudicial ground, to defy and overrule the public will, as clearly announced by the legis-
lative organ.” (emphasis in original)). 
 60 Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796) (emphasis in original). 
 61 Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 18 (1800). 
 62 Id. at 19; see also JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN 
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1893) (arguing 
courts may not invalidate a law “as a mere matter of course,—merely because it is con-
cluded that upon a just and true construction the law is unconstitutional.  That is pre-
cisely the significance of the rule of administration that the courts lay down.  It can only 
disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a 
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational ques-
tion”). 
 63 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810). 
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which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”64 
That was Marshall’s reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
but consider the violence it does to the text.  “Necessary and Proper” 
is the language of strict scrutiny:  the Congress may pass laws which 
are necessary to secure a proper government interest; whatever is not 
necessary is not authorized.65  Marshall, however, transformed the 
clause into a species of rational basis review:  the Congress may pass 
laws that are “adapted” (that is, rationally related) to any legitimate 
government interest.66  And so the constitutional presumption of lib-
erty was reversed.  Instead of adhering to the constitutional design of 
limited and enumerated powers—in short, the view that what the 
Constitution does not authorize the National Government to do it 
prohibits the National Government from doing—the courts decided, 
rather than confront the legislature, that the National Government 
may do whatever the Constitution does not prohibit.  And who can 
blame them?  It would take some nerve for an unelected judge, 
armed only with the power to persuade, to tell the people that a law 
duly adopted by a majority of both chambers of the legislature and 
signed by the executive will not be given effect because it is not, in 
the judge’s opinion, “necessary” but merely “expedient.”  And so the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty (Madison’s republican tendency) 
doomed the Necessary and Proper Clause and, along with it, the 
nondelegation doctrine. 
Justice Scalia explained this outcome in his dissent from Mistretta 
v. United States,67 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission over a challenge based 
upon the separation of powers.  “[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional delegation is unquestionably a fundamental element of our 
constitutional system,” Scalia reasoned that because “no statute can 
be entirely precise, and that some judgments . . . must be left to the 
 
 64 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
 65 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power:  A Jurisdictional 
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 313–14 (1993) (arguing the phrase 
“necessary and proper” was originally “understood as a significant limitation on legislative 
power”).  Lawson and Granger document that the word “proper” was understood to re-
quire congressional statutes to conform to norms of federalism and separation of powers.  
Randy Barnett has aptly denominated the presumption against legislative action “the pre-
sumption of liberty.”  See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
 66 McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419.  Marshall argues the Congress “may employ the 
most convenient means.”  Id. at 409. 
 67 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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officers executing the law and to the judges applying it, the debate 
over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point 
of principle but over a question of degree.”68  Such a determination 
involves “multifarious and (in the nonpartisan sense) highly political” 
considerations as to which the Congress and not the Court has the 
institutional competence.69  Among those considerations Scalia in-
cluded “whether the Nation is at war” or faces some inchoate emer-
gency, here referring to the D.C. Circuit case upholding wage and 
price controls in the claimed economic emergency of 1971.70 
Although claims of emergency are indeed matters about which 
the Court is properly hesitant to second-guess the political branches, 
Justice Scalia’s explanation is not convincing.  The separation of 
powers is not a “highly political” consideration wisely left to the po-
litical branches but a fundament of the constitutional framework 
within which our politics—and our political branches—are supposed 
to operate.  No meaningful concept even of necessity, much less of 
emergency, could justify routine delegation of the lawmaking func-
tion to agencies and courts.  What is needed (or what was needed, if 
it is too late to rescue the nondelegation doctrine) is a Supreme 
Court that heeds Madison’s warning about the propensity, in repub-
lics, of the legislative power to dominate the other branches of gov-
ernment and in response develops a judicially manageable standard 
for distinguishing excessive or unjustified delegations from those 
meeting, as Chief Justice Taft had put it, “the inherent necessities of 
the governmental co-ordination.”71  What is needed, in short, is a 
 
 68 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. at 416. 
 70 Id. 
 71 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); see Antonin Scalia, A 
Note on the Benzene Case, REG., July-Aug. 1980, at 25, 28 (“[S]urely vague constitutional 
doctrines are not automatically unacceptable.  The Court’s opinions from obscenity to 
church-state relations to the commerce clause are full of them.  And the risk of vagueness 
here [in applying the nondelegation doctrine] is much less than elsewhere.”); see also 
Louis L. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power:  II, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 577 
(1947) (“[N]early every doctrine of constitutional limitation has been attacked as vague.  
Essentially the charges go to the institution of judicial review as we have it rather than 
specifically to the delegation doctrine.”).  Readers of the Constitution in the eighteenth 
century understood the substantive distinction between legislative and executive power—
see Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 341 (2002) and Mi-
chael B. Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 265 (2001)—and the Court routinely draws such a distinction in other contexts.  See, 
e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 444 (1998) (holding cancellations pursu-
ant to the Line Item Veto Act are “exercises of legislative power”); INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (holding the one-house veto to be “legislative in purpose and ef-
fect”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 690 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting) (“The function of making laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive can 
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Court that recognizes that the nondelegation principle—although it 
is, like judicial review itself, a predominantly structural rather than a 
textual element—is no less a part of the judiciary’s charge to uphold 
the Constitution.  Instead, the judiciary, shrinking before the author-
ity of the democratic legislature, has been complicit in allowing dele-
gation to run riot.72 
 
not exercise that function to any degree.”); Springer v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands, 
277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) (“[T]he legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legis-
lative office, since that would be to usurp the power of appointment by indirection . . . .”); 
cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“I believe that there are cases in which . . . the significance of the delegated decision is 
simply too great for the decision to be called anything other than ‘legislative.’”); Indus. 
Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 675 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[I]n my opinion decisions such as Panama Refining 
Co. v. Ryan suffer from none of the excesses of judicial policymaking that plagued some 
of the other decisions of that era.” (internal citation omitted)). 
   Modern scholars have proposed various formulations of a judicially manageable 
nondelegation principle.  See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL 
STRUCTURE 136 (1995) (arguing courts should “demand as the prerequisite for legislative 
action some meaningful level of normative political commitment by the enacting legisla-
tors, thus enabling the electorate to judge its representatives”); DAVID SCHOENBROD, 
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:  HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH 
DELEGATION 183 (1993) (arguing “a person interested in knowing whether the statute 
prohibits any given conduct will, in most cases, get a clear answer from the statute that 
states the law, but may well get no answer, for any particular case, from a statute that del-
egates”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1239 (1994) (arguing “the core of the Constitution’s nondelegation principle can be ex-
pressed as follows:  Congress must make whatever policy decisions are sufficiently impor-
tant to the statutory scheme at issue so that Congress must make them”). 
 72 The nondelegation doctrine is too essential a principle of American constitutionalism to 
disappear entirely.  It survives instinctively, if only as part of “the constitution in exile,” see 
Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REG., Winter 1995, at 83, 84 (reviewing 
DAVID SCHOENBROD, supra note 71), appearing variously in the guise of the Due Process 
Clause, see, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding the Congress 
violated due process by authorizing a majority of coal producers to set regulations for 
their entire industry because it “is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it 
is not even delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to 
private persons whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in 
the same business”), or the “void for vagueness” doctrine, see, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (“Statutory language of such a standardless sweep allows policemen, 
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.  Legislatures may not so 
abdicate their responsibilities for setting the standards of the criminal law.”), or the re-
quirements of bicameralism and presentment, see, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952 (invalidat-
ing one-house veto that “was essentially legislative in purpose and effect”), or canons of 
construction that cabin executive discretion, see, e.g., Benzene Case, 448 U.S. at 641 (inter-
preting the Occupational Safety and Health Act to require the elimination of only “sig-
nificant risks of harm”); see also John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 
(2000). 
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II. 
If the judiciary has failed to resist the encroachments of the Con-
gress, then what can be said of the executive?  In The Unitary Executive, 
Professors Calabresi and Yoo remind us, with impressive scholarly de-
tail, that every one of our nation’s Presidents has asserted his right to 
direct the activities of the executive branch.73  But that only makes 
one even more curious:  how is it that, despite an unexceptioned line 
of Presidents insisting upon the unity and independence of the ex-
ecutive, the executive branch could be transformed into a junior var-
sity legislature, issuing innumerable regulations according to no intel-
ligible principle dictated by the Congress yet having, by judicial 
interpretation, the force of law? 
The fragmentation of the executive, despite both its unassailably 
unitary pedigree and, as Calabresi and Yoo have documented, the un-
interrupted efforts of American Presidents, can be a mystery only to 
those who focus upon formal lines of authority rather than political 
reality.  Political scientists have long recognized that formally allo-
cated “powers” are no guarantee of actual power.  As Richard Neus-
tadt trenchantly observed, “[t]he President of the United States has 
an extraordinary range of formal powers, of authority in statute law 
and in the Constitution. . . . [But] despite his ‘powers’ he does not 
obtain results by giving orders—or not, at any rate, merely by giving 
orders. . . . Presidential power is the power to persuade.”74 
In the normal course, Presidents have very little contact with 
agency heads, let alone lesser policymakers within the agencies, and 
hence very little opportunity to persuade them.  Instead, the agency 
policymakers interact with, are open to persuasion by, and become 
clients of others:  the congressional committees that oversee their 
work, the industry they regulate, the trade press that reports their ac-
tivities, and the permanent bureaucracy over whom they nominally 
preside.  These constituencies reinforce the natural tendency of an 
agency, formed with a narrow mandate, to pursue a maximalist agen-
da within its own field of authority and without regard to competing 
values, let alone the policy objectives of the rather remote President 
of the United States.75  Those objectives are voiced through the regu-
 
 73 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 11. 
 74 RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS:  THE POLITICS 
OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 10–11 (The Free Press 1990) (1960). 
 75 See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemak-
ing, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986) (“We all know that a government agency charged 
with the responsibility of defending the nation or constructing highways or promoting 
trade will invariably wish to spend ‘too much’ on its goals.  An agency succeeds by accom-
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latory review program, nascent under President Nixon and main-
tained or expanded by every President since.  Even regulatory review, 
however, depends upon persuasion; the routine exercise of presiden-
tial authority would be counterproductive as it would antagonize both 
the regulating agencies and their patrons in the Congress. 
Considering the forces arrayed against the President within his 
own branch of government, we recur to Madison’s insight that “the 
weakness of the executive may require . . . that it should be forti-
fied.”76  Perhaps the greatest and most vigorous exponent of an ex-
pansive administrative state, Franklin Roosevelt, was acutely aware of 
the need to shore up the executive against the Congress, as is high-
lighted by the episode, recounted in The Unitary Executive, concerning 
the Brownlow Committee.  Louis Brownlow, an architect of FDR’s 
domestic policy, also served as chairman of his Committee on Admin-
istrative Management, which recommended (with the President’s en-
thusiastic support) the integration of the so-called independent 
agencies into the executive departments.  The Committee observed 
that the Constitution “places in the President, and in the President 
alone, the whole executive power of the Government of the United 
States,”77 yet “governmental powers of great importance are being ex-
ercised under conditions of virtual irresponsibility” by regulatory 
commissions beyond the President’s direction: 
The commissions produce confusion, conflict, and incoherence in the 
formulation and in the execution of the President’s policies. Not only by 
constitutional theory, but by the steady and mounting insistence of pub-
lic opinion, the President is held responsible for the wise and efficient 
management of the Executive Branch of the Government.  The people 
look to him for leadership.  And yet we whittle away the effective control 
essential to that leadership by parceling out to a dozen or more irrespon-
sible agencies important powers of policy and administration.78 
The Committee concluded the so-called independent agencies 
had become a “‘fourth branch’ of the government for which there is 
no sanction in the Constitution” and which had begun to “defeat[] 
the constitutional intent that there be a single responsible Chief Ex-
ecutive to coordinate and manage the departments and activities in 
 
plishing the goals Congress set for it as thoroughly as possible—not by balancing its goals 
against other, equally worthy goals.”). 
 76 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 319–20. 
 77 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH STUDIES OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 31 (1937). 
 78 Id. at 40. 
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accordance with the laws enacted by the Congress.”79  The Committee 
implicitly invoked the Lockean nondelegation principle that stood 
behind the constitutional design:  “[p]ower without responsibility has 
no place in a government based on the theory of democratic con-
trol,” read its report, “for responsibility is the people’s only weapon, 
their only insurance against abuse of power.”80  In other, more famil-
iar words, the people having delegated legislative power to the Con-
gress, that power could not properly be delegated further to un-
elected and hence potentially unaccountable agencies.81 
The Brownlow Committee’s recommendations represented the 
executive’s attempt to maintain the constitutional separation of pow-
ers through a robust nondelegation doctrine, on the one hand, and a 
unitary executive branch, on the other.  Notably, the President said in 
transmitting the report to the Congress: 
What I am placing before you is not the request for more power, but for 
the tools of management and the authority to distribute the work so that 
the President can effectively discharge those powers which the Constitu-
tion now places upon him.  Unless we are prepared to abandon this im-
portant part of the Constitution, we must equip the Presidency with au-
thority commensurate with his responsibilities under the Constitution.82 
 
 79 81 CONG. REC. 187–88 (1937) (written statement of President Roosevelt, read by the Pres-
ident pro tempore). 
 80 THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT, supra note 77, at 40; see also Robert E. Cush-
man, The Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 
13, 33 (1938) (arguing “that one whose rights have been adversely affected by the exer-
cise of unrestrained legislative discretion in the hands of an administrative officer or 
agency is actually being deprived of liberty or property without due process of law”). 
 81 Cf. Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 685 
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[T]he nondelegation doctrine . . . ensures to the ex-
tent consistent with orderly governmental administration that important choices of social 
policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the pop-
ular will.”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276–77 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(arguing an executive officer’s judgment “is not a constitutionally acceptable substitute 
for Congress’ judgment, in the absence of further, limiting guidance”); Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (“The principle that au-
thority granted by the legislature must be limited by adequate standards . . . insures that 
the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an appointed official 
but by the body immediately responsible to the people.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Ad-
ministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2368 (2001) (“The nondelegation doc-
trine . . . promote[s] distinctive rule of law values [because] legislative stan-
dards . . . provide notice, prevent arbitrariness, and facilitate judicial review.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 335–36 (1999) (argu-
ing the nondelegation doctrine promotes “the kind of accountability that comes from re-
quiring specific decisions from a deliberative body reflecting the views of representatives 
from various states of the union”). 
 82 81 CONG. REC. 188 (1937) (written statement of President Roosevelt, read by the Presi-
dent pro tempore). 
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To be more precise but less diplomatic, President Roosevelt was 
asking not as much for authority commensurate with his responsibili-
ties as for a rollback of the Congress’s encroachment upon his re-
sponsibilities.  Roosevelt may not have opposed the expansion of ex-
ecutive authority, in the form of delegations from the Congress, but 
he insisted that all executive activity should remain subject to presi-
dential direction.  The Congress, of course, did not agree to decolo-
nize the executive. 
In this respect, the New Deal really does represent what Cass Sun-
stein has called an “unfinished revolution,” though not in the way 
Sunstein had in mind.83  Roosevelt wanted the authority of the execu-
tive dispersed among specialized agencies subordinate to the Presi-
dent, so the President would be presented with conflicting policy ad-
vice, disagreements, and options.  That is precisely the circumstance 
in which the President can most effectively exercise his power to per-
suade, as the ultimate decisionmaker, by mediating intra-branch dis-
putes and shaping final agreements.  As Carnes Lord has written, 
Roosevelt “sought to maximize presidential control through fragmen-
tation of bureaucratic authority and active encouragement of conflict 
between individuals and agencies with unclear or overlapping man-
dates.”84  As Richard K. Betts put it, Roosevelt “dominated his bur-
geoning bureaucracies by politicizing them, by placing trusted lieu-
tenants in middle-level positions, and by encouraging overlapping of 
jurisdictions, proliferation of communication channels, and bureau-
cratic competition and conflict to force issues to the top, maximizing 
the President’s range of choice.”85  Such policy leadership is impossi-
ble when important questions are resolved without ever reaching the 
White House. 
Roosevelt’s failure to finish his revolution left not only policy de-
velopment but ultimate decision-making authority fragmented.  As a 
result, all that advice, all those disagreements and options, get fil-
tered out by the agency head if not by the civil servants below him, 
and a decision is reached without the President ever considering or 
even being made aware of the issue, let alone balancing conflicting 
priorities in keeping with his vision of national policy. 
 
 83 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS:  FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND 
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004). 
 84 CARNES LORD, THE PRESIDENCY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY 29 (1988). 
 85 RICHARD K. BETTS, SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND COLD WAR CRISES 33 (1977). 
Feb. 2010] NONDELEGATION AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 269 
 
III. 
Madison, of course, was right about the imperial instinct of the 
legislature:  “[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the 
sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vor-
tex.”86  Neither the judiciary nor the executive has managed to resist 
its force.  Indeed, our system increasingly resembles the historical 
British system of parliamentary supremacy that the Framers did not 
adopt, despite their familiarity with its workings; there the executive 
and the judiciary exercise distinct powers, but do so only as agents of 
the legislature.  Why, we might ask, did the Framers disfavor that sys-
tem?  What did they understand that we have lost? 
First, consider accountability.  The Clean Air Act provides a useful 
illustration.  The Congress amended the Act in 1970 to “force techno-
logical development” by requiring automobile manufacturers to ef-
fect a 90% reduction in pollution emissions within five years—with 
devastating, industry-destroying penalties for noncompliance.87  The 
Congress, not knowing whether achieving its goal was possible, but 
not wanting to be blamed either for failing to reach it or for destroy-
ing the industry, delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) the authority to extend the deadline if necessary. 
Various manufacturers applied for an extension in 1972, provid-
ing information to show the technical infeasibility of meeting the 
deadline.  The EPA Administrator decided the manufacturers’ analy-
sis was faulty, substituted his own, found he was “unable” to deter-
mine whether effective control technology was possible, and conse-
quently denied the companies’ applications.  The companies 
petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit, and it fell to Judge Harold 
Leventhal—a distinguished jurisprude but not much of a technosci-
entist—to evaluate data from five hundred test vehicles, comparing 
the impact of noble metal monolithic catalysts with base metal pellet 
catalysts, noble metal pellet catalysts, reactor systems, and various re-
actor/catalyst combinations in order to determine which methodol-
ogy was most appropriate and whether the technology was feasible.88  
 
 86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) supra note 12, at 306.  Madison’s phrase does 
not necessarily imply that the Congress becomes more powerful, only that its expanding 
activity disrupts the balance of power; it is not always clear where political authority ends 
up. 
 87 See Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1690 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006)). 
 88 Int’l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 633 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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The case, as Judge Leventhal put it, “taxes our ability to understand 
and evaluate technical issues.”89 
More than that, it was the court of appeals—not the people’s rep-
resentatives, not even the bureaucrats at the EPA—who balanced the 
environmental costs of pollution against the economic costs to the 
auto industry and decided whether to extend the deadline.  To be 
sure, the court did so with some trepidation.  Leventhal prefaced the 
court’s discussion of the EPA’s methodology “with admission of our 
doubts and diffidence.”90  Again, later:  “[i]t is with utmost diffidence 
that we approach our assignment to review the Administrator’s deci-
sion on ‘available technology.’”91  For good measure, Leventhal con-
cluded the opinion by noting, “[i]t is not without diffidence that a 
court undertakes to probe even partly into technical matters of the 
complexity of those covered in this opinion.”92 
Thus does the quasi-parliamentary system that has evolved result 
in a government of buck-passing.  The Congress can claim to have de-
livered clean air but disclaim the costs associated with achieving that 
goal or, if there is no success, can disclaim responsibility for the fail-
ure.93  The hard decisions are too often left to the courts, which have 
neither the legitimate authority nor the resources to evaluate com-
plex policy matters or to balance the costs and benefits to American 
society.94  Moreover, judicial decisions taken in this manner are made 
with neither energy and dispatch nor with public deliberation, but—
as Judge Leventhal said—with “doubts and diffidence.” 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 632. 
 91 Id. at 641. 
 92 Id. at 647. 
 93 As the Supreme Court has noted, the nondelegation doctrine prevents such unaccount-
ability.  See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996) (“The clear assignment of 
power to a branch . . . allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, 
or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.  [One] 
strand of our separation-of-powers jurisprudence, the delegation doctrine, has developed 
to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties.”). 
 94 Writing in 1980, then-Professor Scalia noted that because “judicial review of agency action 
is virtually routine, it is the courts, rather than the agencies, that can ultimately determine 
the content of standardless legislation.”  Scalia, supra note 71, at 28.  See also Indus. Union 
Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (The Benzene Case), 448 U.S. 607, 672 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring) (arguing that the divergent opinions of the justices over “whether the statistical 
possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of 
preventing those deaths. . . . demonstrate, perhaps better than any other fact, that Con-
gress, the governmental body best suited and most obligated to make the choice con-
fronting us in this litigation, has improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of La-
bor and, derivatively, to this Court”); cf. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 
87 (1921) (noting that the power to define crimes “cannot be delegated either to the 
courts or to the juries”). 
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The Supreme Court, uncomfortable with the courts playing this 
policy role, has adopted a posture of deference to the legal conclu-
sions of administrative agencies.95  Indeed, the Supreme Court in 
Chevron v. NRDC upbraided the petitioners for “waging in a judicial 
forum a specific policy battle which they ultimately lost in the agen-
cy . . . but one which was never waged in the Congress.”96  Chevron 
took the courts out of such policy battles, but at the cost of greater 
delegation to the agency.97  Take, as an example, the breadth of the 
implicit delegation the Court discerned in the Endangered Species 
Act, which makes it unlawful for any person to “take” an animal of an 
endangered or threatened species.  Applying Chevron, the Court held 
that the EPA permissibly interpreted the word “take” to prohibit “sig-
nificant habitat modification or degradation” because “to take” in-
cludes “to harm,” and the species could be harmed by altering the an-
imals’ habitat.98  If an agency’s interpretation of the statute from 
which it derives its authority is simply unreasonable, the courts still 
may step in, as when the FDA asserted authority to regulate tobacco 
products as drug-delivery devices.99  When a court intervenes, how-
ever, it is often deciding a question never considered by the Con-
gress.  Whatever one thinks of Massachusetts v. EPA,100 in which the 
Supreme Court ordered the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emis-
sions, the fact remains that the Congress never confronted the costs 
and benefits of regulating carbon emissions. 
The second thing the Framers understood is that democracy is 
weakened when the locus of policymaking shifts from the Congress to 
an agency and to the specialized congressional committees that over-
see that agency—with aid, of course, from every affiliated pressure 
group.  As political scientist Theodore Lowi has argued, the delega-
tion of policy problems to administrative agencies fosters “the atro-
phy of institutions of popular control” because agency heads exercise 
their discretion in accordance with relationships between agencies 
 
 95 See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Tho-
mas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992). 
 96 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864. 
 97 See id. at 865–66 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief 
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to 
make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged 
with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”). 
 98 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 99 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
100 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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and interest groups rather than a full view of national priorities.101  To 
solve the problem, Lowi counseled a return to “juridical democracy,” 
which would mean limiting the federal role “to those practices for 
which it is possible to develop a clear and authoritative rule of law, 
enacted democratically and implemented absolutely” and asking the 
Supreme Court to declare “invalid and unconstitutional any delega-
tion of power to an administrative agency that is not accompanied by 
clear standards of implementation.”102  Indeed, the point of the non-
delegation doctrine was to keep the locus of lawmaking power in the 
Congress, where the requirements of bicameralism and presentment 
assure a connection to the public will.  If the Congress had to vote on 
the Code of Federal Regulations rule by rule, much if not most of it 
surely would fail.  Yet those rules have the force of law without the 
Congress having voted at all.  Instead, a phalanx of administrative of-
ficers in the executive branch, working most closely with their con-
gressional oversight committees and the industries they regulate, 
write the rules that govern the various spheres of American life. 
Third, the Framers understood, and we have lost, the energy that 
is the distinguishing characteristic of a unitary, independent execu-
tive.  “That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed,” Hamil-
ton wrote in The Federalist No. 70.  “Decision, activity, secrecy, and dis-
patch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a 
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater 
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these quali-
ties will be diminished.”103  Indeed they have been.  Jurisdiction over 
the use and handling of formaldehyde, for example, is shared among 
the EPA, the OSHA, the FDA, the CPSC, and HUD—each of which, 
in its regulations, applies different methodological assumptions con-
cerning key variables, such as the value of a statistical life, the level of 
human exposure, and its effect upon human health.104  A report by 
the Government Accountability Office found “notable differences in 
the . . . specific approaches, methods, and assumptions” of the EPA, 
the FDA, and the OSHA in assessing risks of chemical exposure such 
that “risk estimates prepared by different agencies, or by different 
program offices within those agencies, may not be directly compara-
 
101 THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM:  IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF 
PUBLIC AUTHORITY 86–90 (1969). 
102 Id. at 271, 297–98. 
103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 12, at 422–23. 
104 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:  TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 46 (1993) (discussing the assumptions of risk exposure made by the EPA 
and the OSHA in assessing individual risks). 
Feb. 2010] NONDELEGATION AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 273 
 
ble, even if the same chemical agent is the subject of the risk assess-
ment.”105  And these are not even so-called independent agencies; 
they are all squarely in the executive branch.  Yet each carries out a 
mandate from the Congress directly to the agency, and the congres-
sional delegations displace unitary executive leadership.  The lack of 
presidential control over the independent agencies is explicit:  so it is 
that the Secretary of the Treasury, as the presidential agent who over-
sees the Comptroller of the Currency, can promise swift action to re-
store confidence in the banking system but cannot secure the coop-
eration of the independent FDIC, CFTC, or SEC.106 
In exchange for the loss of energy, the Progressive Era theory 
goes, we get better government, that is, government by experts.107  In 
principle, legislators make broad policy decisions and delegate to ex-
pert administrators responsibility for filling in the narrow technical 
details.  Again, this makes sense in a formal, legalistic way but, as the 
political scientists know, the reality is different.  The Congress cannot 
simply delegate technical questions; modern administration involves 
so many complex scientific, economic, and technological questions 
that agency rulemaking involves the same kinds of policy choices, in-
terest balancing, and power struggles that attend real lawmaking by 
real legislatures.  Nor does better legislation follow when technocrats 
are left to make such decisions.  As political scientist Robert Dahl has 
written: 
No intellectually defensible claim can be made that policy el-
ites . . . possess superior moral knowledge or more specifically superior 
knowledge of what constitutes the public good.  Indeed, we have some 
reason for thinking that specialization, which is the very ground for the 
influence of policy elites, may itself impair their capacity for moral judg-
ment.  Likewise, precisely because the knowledge of the policy elites is 
specialized, their expert knowledge ordinarily provides too narrow a base 
 
105 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT:  SELECTED FEDERAL 
AGENCIES’ PROCEDURES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND POLICIES 46 (2001). 
106 See Damian Paletta & Deborah Solomon, Geithner Vents as Overhaul Stumbles, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 4, 2009, at A1 (reporting on the resistance of leaders of the Federal Reserve Board, 
the FDIC, and the SEC to the administration’s proposal for financial regulatory reform 
and the frustration of the Secretary of the Treasury, who “reminded attendees that the 
administration and Congress set policy, not the regulatory agencies”). 
107 See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938) (“In terms of political theory, 
the administrative process springs from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite form of gov-
ernment to deal with modern problems.”); see also DWIGHT WALDO, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE:  A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 120 
(1948) (discussing the view that independent regulatory commissions developed to “fill a 
vacuum created by the separation of powers”). 
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for the instrumental judgments that an intelligent policy would re-
quire.108 
For this reason, perhaps, most agency heads are not scientists, engi-
neers, or other sorts of technical experts.  They are political opera-
tives.  Consider the EPA:  between 1970 and 2009, American Presi-
dents appointed eleven administrators of the EPA, only two of whom 
were scientists.109  President Obama appointed a career environ-
mental administrator trained as a chemical engineer, but then 
tapped a lawyer-legislator and former EPA administrator to run cli-
mate change policy directly from the White House.110 
* * * 
Surely President Obama, no less than his predecessors, wants to 
determine the policies of the executive branch as he goes about the 
execution of the laws.  The President may not always resist delega-
tions of authority to executive agencies, but at least when the Con-
gress attempts to dictate policies to the executive and to those agen-
cies, every American President has advanced the constitutional 
principle that the executive is unitary.111  Most recently, President 
Obama has pursued two principal strategies to strengthen his control 
over the executive.  First, he has tried to insulate policymakers in the 
executive branch from legislative control.  In his first year he has ap-
pointed about twice as many “czars” as the Romanov dynasty had in 
 
108 ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 337 (1989). 
109 SCHOENBROD, supra note 71, at 120 (noting that “[f]rom EPA’s inception in 1970, seven 
of its eight administrators . . . were lawyers”).  Since Schoenbrod made that observation, 
President Bush appointed to the post two former governors and one scientist. 
110 Press Release, President-Elect Barack Obama, President-Elect Barack Obama Announces 
Key Members of Energy and Environment Team (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://change.gov/newsroom/entry/president_elect_barack_obama_announces_key_m
embers_of_energy_and_environmen/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010) (announcing the ap-
pointment of Carol Browner to the new White House post of Assistant to the President 
for Energy and Climate Change); see also Tom Kenworthy, Activist Ex-Aide to Gore Tapped to 
Direct EPA, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 1992, at A10 (noting “Browner has the mind and train-
ing of an attorney-legislator but the soul of an activist”). 
111 Justice Scalia has suggested that if “the scope of delegation is largely uncontrollable by 
the courts, we must be particularly rigorous in preserving the Constitution’s structural re-
strictions that deter excessive delegation,” among which he counts presidential or at least 
non-congressional control of the executive branch, because the Congress will hesitate to 
delegate authority to officers it cannot control.  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
416–17 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 421 (noting that “even after it has been ac-
cepted . . . that those exercising executive power need not be subject to the control of the 
President, Congress would still be more reluctant to augment the power of even an inde-
pendent executive agency than to create an otherwise powerless repository for its delega-
tion”). 
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300 years; they help to formulate the President’s policies on every-
thing from economic recovery to domestic violence to peace in the 
Middle East—and they operate outside the morass of congressional 
oversight and agency rulemaking.112 
Second, like his recent predecessors, President Obama has taken 
to issuing signing statements.  During the 2008 presidential cam-
paign, candidate Obama promised he would “sign legislation in the 
light of day without attaching signing statements that undermine the 
legislative intent”113 and would “not use signing statements to nullify 
or undermine congressional instructions as enacted into law.”114  
Since assuming office, however, the President has pointed out that 
Presidents have issued signing statements “[f]or nearly two centu-
ries,” opined that “such signing statements serve a legitimate function 
in our system,” and announced that he intends to continue the prac-
tice “when it is appropriate to do so as a means of discharging my 
constitutional responsibilities.”115 
President Obama has so far employed signing statements to indi-
cate he is not bound to press for certain policies within international 
organizations, follow format requirements for budget requests, accept 
congressional limitations upon his appointments to a commission, 
condition American participation in United Nations peacekeeping 
missions upon the approval of U.S. military leaders, or honor whistle-
blower protections for federal employees who give information to the 
Congress.116  Predictably, the czars and the signing statements have 
 
112 Steven Menashi, All the President’s Czars, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 12, 2009, at 16 (“By estab-
lishing policy czars accountable only to himself, Obama has sought to unify executive po-
licymaking and guard against bureaucratic and congressional usurpation.”); see also Mi-
chael A. Fletcher & Brady Dennis, Obama’s Many Policy “Czars” Draw Ire from Conservatives, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2009, at A6 (“Critics of the proliferation of czars say the White 
House uses the appointments to circumvent the normal vetting process required for Sen-
ate confirmation and to avoid congressional oversight.”); Don Wolfensberger, Opinion, 
Policy Czars Fuel White House Power Surge, ROLL CALL, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://www.rollcall.com/issues/55_43/procedural_politics/39638-1.html (noting “the 
bigger the White House policy apparatus becomes, the more Congress is suspicious of the 
policies being devised, offended they’ve been left out of the loop and outraged about be-
ing denied information essential to good oversight”). 
113 Position Paper, Obama Campaign ’08, Restoring Trust in Government and Improving 
Transparency, at 4, http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/TakingBackOurGovernment 
BackFinalFactSheet.pdf. 
114 Charlie Savage, Barack Obama’s Q&A, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/. 
115 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Memorandum-on-Presidential-Signing-Statements/. 
116 See Charlie Savage, Obama’s Embrace of Bush Tactic Criticized by Lawmakers From Both Parties, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A1 (“President Obama has issued signing statements claiming 
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raised hackles from the Congress, which understandably prefers to 
have its own way in matters of policy.117  But so does the President.  
That, in the end, is the last and, for that reason alone, the best hope 
for our system of separated powers.  As Madison put it, “the great se-
curity against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the 
same department consists in giving to those who administer each de-
partment the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to 
resist encroachments of the others.”118  With the constitutional means 
now lost, the great security has come down to personal motive—that 
is, to the fortitude of the President. 
 
the authority to bypass dozens of provisions of bills enacted into law since he took office, 
provoking mounting criticism by lawmakers from both parties.”). 
117 A recent letter to President Obama from Democratic leaders reads, “During the previous 
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choose which aspects of congressional statutes he was required to enforce.  We were 
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gressmen Barney Frank & David R. Obey, Frank and Colleagues Warn the President 
About the Use of Signing Statements, July 21, 2009, available at http://www.house.gov 
/frank/pressreleases/2009/07-21-09-signing-statements-letter-obama.html.  Senator Ro-
bert Byrd wrote to President Obama to voice his concern that White House czars could 
“threaten the Constitutional system of checks and balances.”  Press Release, Senator Ro-
bert C. Byrd, Byrd Questions Obama Administration on Role of White House “Czar” Posi-
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